kleph
22-02-2006, 07:06 AM
Hugo Chavez, the President of Venezuela, is a charismatic but perplexing figure. He certainly has captured the imagination of his country as well as the nervous attention of the U.S. with his quasi-socialist hurangs and anti-imperialist chest beating.
But how much of it has substance? Earlier this month, he announced he was selling all U.S. refinery contracts but then said they were only under review. Last month he sent troops to confiscate a 32,000-acre ranch held by a British company then said it was only until the property could be assessed.
These moves, although still unresolved, have masterfully kept his foreign foils confused and his internal popularity at a remarkable high. His domestic political currency is strong and his foreign policy is clearly savvy.
I recently completed reading The United States and Venezuela, one of the excellent series on Contemporary Inter-American Relations. Published in 2002, the book only has a brief view of the very beginning of Chavez’s administration, but it's the co-authors' ability to put the situation in a politically historic perspective which is astonishingly illuminating.
For the nascent student of Latin America this is one of the best books to begin one’s study. There is a plague of Alphabet Soup agencies, arcane back history, contrasting motivations and the formidable language barrier all to be overcome. This book provides one of the single best thumbnail explanations of American foreign policy and how it works in the modern era that I have ever run across.
Need to know what Brady Bonds are and how they can disrupt U.S. foreign policy? Wondering what international agreement is in place to oversee the thorny problem of intellectual property rights? Looking for the thumbnail explanation and history of the Free Trade Association for the Americas? This little book has it.
What you get, in short, is an excellent reference volume for a battery of issues and topics that affect all of South America.
So, who is Hugo Chavez? Is he the bogyman of the U.S.’s imperialist schemes in the hemisphere or a deranged socialist dictator wanna be? After reading this book, I have to think neither.
The first and most vexing problem that afflicts both countries is the stigmatism of perspective. Both seem profoundly incapable of understanding the situation of the other.
“At the same time, neither Venezuela nor the United States seems to recognize the limits imposed by domestic factors in the other country and assumes the other is stubborn or unfeeling in its negotiations.” (This quote, like all others in this essay, comes from the book)
The result is a miasma of misunderstanding that is further acerbated by the shorthand assessment of the issues via the media – particularly when it comes to assessing the status of Chavez.
I think the best assessment is the book’s description of Chavez as a politician, “whose change of pace and tone has ended to keep both friend and foe slightly off balance.” A strategy that has clear attractions in a region where the stability of a democracy can be quickly overthrown due to rapid cultural, political and economic changes.
The most important aspect of this book is perspective. It is impossible to understand Chavez and his country without a degree of understanding about the recent history – political and economic – of Venezuela. A history that produced Chavez.
Chavez and his cohorts were behind the failed 1992 military coup that tried to overthrow the government. But it wasn’t a coup in the traditional South American style. It was a coup with a specific political purpose.
“The coup attempt must be looked at as a rejection of the democratic system as it had developed over the years and not a simple action of the movement against a particular government.”
The plotters were formed by their relatively liberal education in the country’s military but they also held the tenet of pragmatism common among soldiers.
“That education stressed the role of national autonomy and the strengthening of the nation through the integration of the military in all aspects of society.”
So the perceived belligerence of Chavez is less an effort to attack the U.S. than a specific strategy to fortify the tenet of Venezuelan politics.
“Venezuela seeks at times to escape from the dilemma of globalization by insisting on its own sovereignty and right to go its own way. Venezuela’s tendency to favor national over international approaches has been a constant in it’s history.”
Chavez has recently moved to establish trade ties – particularly in the exchange of oil – with other countries, notably emerging powers China and India. Venezuela has long sought to diversify it’s economic ties with the United States although those efforts are often perceived as simple Anti-American sentiment.
“An implicit declaration that the United States would continue to be an important point of reference for the country but its relative power would be counterbalanced by the multiplication of other contracts.”
Given the proven economic precipice single-item economies have produced in the continent, this is, again, the pragmatic approach.
A perfect example of these grand paradoxes is the recent dispute with Colombia and the manner that the U.S. was drawn into it. When it was revealed that Colombian forces in Caracas had captured a Marxist revolutionary, Chavez immediately broke ties with its neighbor and slammed the U.S. for interfering when it called on other South American countries to intervene in the dispute.
But Venezuela’s blind eye to the Colombian rebels, perceived as a soft spot for their socialism, perhaps has more to do with national security.
“International security would be maximized by negotiating unofficially with guerrillas in neighboring Colombia, even at the expense of degrading relationships with the Colombian government.”
And the U.S. insistence for action would be seen from Caracas as a clear attack on sovereignty due to close economic and military ties between Colombia.
“In Venezuela, the (U.S.) assistance to Colombia, largely in the form of aid to help control the production of drugs, was viewed as dangerous; it would increase Colombia’s relative military power and act as an incentive to guerrilla forces and drug traffickers to shift operations to Venezuela.”
More than $500 million in anti-drug military aid passed on to Colombia days after the resolution of the crisis undoubtedly did little to assuage Venezuela’s concerns in the matter.
Perhaps the greatest threat to Venezuela by Chavez – and to the U.S. by it’s ecomonic ramifications – is presaged by economist John Williamson who has described his presidential power as “ravaging” the state’s economy.
While the populist appeal of many of the reforms will keep the Chavez presidency in place it also threatens the underlying economic stability of the nation. In the short term, that works fine but eventually the bill must be paid.
The obvious parallel is Alan Garcia in Peru. In 1985, Garcia and his APRA party took power. The 36-year-old wunderkind took presidential office with 47 percent of the vote the largest popular percentage ever recorded in Peru. A great deal of this had to do with his populist message and the failures of the previous orthodox regimes.
Garcia began implementing a wide range of liberal reforms including increased wages, slashed taxes, frozen prices and devaluation of the national currency. The result was an economic boom and presidential popularity number in the 90 percent range.
But the bottom fell out. Garcia undercut himself by reneging on foreign debt and a disastrous decision to nationalize the banking system. By the end of his term the GDP had fallen more than 30 percent and inflation had hit 7,000 percent.
Will Chavez meet such an extreme end? Probably not. Venezuela’s hole card of oil is a huge mitigating factor Chavez has been quick to capitalize on and his government has threatened a heck of a lot more than it has carried out in terms of liberalization. Perhaps the only certainty here is that the last chapter of the drama will have a lot of storylines to resolve.
This book is, by no means, the final word on this issue. But what it does provide is a dynamic and needed perspective that is often lost in the coverage of the complex relationship between the United States and Venezuela. There are serious issues at stake here for both sides and a sober look at the actual situation is possibly the most needed element to the dialouge I can think of.
This essay orginally appeared on my website kleph.com (http://www.kleph.com/blog/2005/02/currently-reading.html).
© 2004 C.J. Schexnayder
(Please note that there are no scores for this book as the book review scoring system is yet to be finalised - Ed)
But how much of it has substance? Earlier this month, he announced he was selling all U.S. refinery contracts but then said they were only under review. Last month he sent troops to confiscate a 32,000-acre ranch held by a British company then said it was only until the property could be assessed.
These moves, although still unresolved, have masterfully kept his foreign foils confused and his internal popularity at a remarkable high. His domestic political currency is strong and his foreign policy is clearly savvy.
I recently completed reading The United States and Venezuela, one of the excellent series on Contemporary Inter-American Relations. Published in 2002, the book only has a brief view of the very beginning of Chavez’s administration, but it's the co-authors' ability to put the situation in a politically historic perspective which is astonishingly illuminating.
For the nascent student of Latin America this is one of the best books to begin one’s study. There is a plague of Alphabet Soup agencies, arcane back history, contrasting motivations and the formidable language barrier all to be overcome. This book provides one of the single best thumbnail explanations of American foreign policy and how it works in the modern era that I have ever run across.
Need to know what Brady Bonds are and how they can disrupt U.S. foreign policy? Wondering what international agreement is in place to oversee the thorny problem of intellectual property rights? Looking for the thumbnail explanation and history of the Free Trade Association for the Americas? This little book has it.
What you get, in short, is an excellent reference volume for a battery of issues and topics that affect all of South America.
So, who is Hugo Chavez? Is he the bogyman of the U.S.’s imperialist schemes in the hemisphere or a deranged socialist dictator wanna be? After reading this book, I have to think neither.
The first and most vexing problem that afflicts both countries is the stigmatism of perspective. Both seem profoundly incapable of understanding the situation of the other.
“At the same time, neither Venezuela nor the United States seems to recognize the limits imposed by domestic factors in the other country and assumes the other is stubborn or unfeeling in its negotiations.” (This quote, like all others in this essay, comes from the book)
The result is a miasma of misunderstanding that is further acerbated by the shorthand assessment of the issues via the media – particularly when it comes to assessing the status of Chavez.
I think the best assessment is the book’s description of Chavez as a politician, “whose change of pace and tone has ended to keep both friend and foe slightly off balance.” A strategy that has clear attractions in a region where the stability of a democracy can be quickly overthrown due to rapid cultural, political and economic changes.
The most important aspect of this book is perspective. It is impossible to understand Chavez and his country without a degree of understanding about the recent history – political and economic – of Venezuela. A history that produced Chavez.
Chavez and his cohorts were behind the failed 1992 military coup that tried to overthrow the government. But it wasn’t a coup in the traditional South American style. It was a coup with a specific political purpose.
“The coup attempt must be looked at as a rejection of the democratic system as it had developed over the years and not a simple action of the movement against a particular government.”
The plotters were formed by their relatively liberal education in the country’s military but they also held the tenet of pragmatism common among soldiers.
“That education stressed the role of national autonomy and the strengthening of the nation through the integration of the military in all aspects of society.”
So the perceived belligerence of Chavez is less an effort to attack the U.S. than a specific strategy to fortify the tenet of Venezuelan politics.
“Venezuela seeks at times to escape from the dilemma of globalization by insisting on its own sovereignty and right to go its own way. Venezuela’s tendency to favor national over international approaches has been a constant in it’s history.”
Chavez has recently moved to establish trade ties – particularly in the exchange of oil – with other countries, notably emerging powers China and India. Venezuela has long sought to diversify it’s economic ties with the United States although those efforts are often perceived as simple Anti-American sentiment.
“An implicit declaration that the United States would continue to be an important point of reference for the country but its relative power would be counterbalanced by the multiplication of other contracts.”
Given the proven economic precipice single-item economies have produced in the continent, this is, again, the pragmatic approach.
A perfect example of these grand paradoxes is the recent dispute with Colombia and the manner that the U.S. was drawn into it. When it was revealed that Colombian forces in Caracas had captured a Marxist revolutionary, Chavez immediately broke ties with its neighbor and slammed the U.S. for interfering when it called on other South American countries to intervene in the dispute.
But Venezuela’s blind eye to the Colombian rebels, perceived as a soft spot for their socialism, perhaps has more to do with national security.
“International security would be maximized by negotiating unofficially with guerrillas in neighboring Colombia, even at the expense of degrading relationships with the Colombian government.”
And the U.S. insistence for action would be seen from Caracas as a clear attack on sovereignty due to close economic and military ties between Colombia.
“In Venezuela, the (U.S.) assistance to Colombia, largely in the form of aid to help control the production of drugs, was viewed as dangerous; it would increase Colombia’s relative military power and act as an incentive to guerrilla forces and drug traffickers to shift operations to Venezuela.”
More than $500 million in anti-drug military aid passed on to Colombia days after the resolution of the crisis undoubtedly did little to assuage Venezuela’s concerns in the matter.
Perhaps the greatest threat to Venezuela by Chavez – and to the U.S. by it’s ecomonic ramifications – is presaged by economist John Williamson who has described his presidential power as “ravaging” the state’s economy.
While the populist appeal of many of the reforms will keep the Chavez presidency in place it also threatens the underlying economic stability of the nation. In the short term, that works fine but eventually the bill must be paid.
The obvious parallel is Alan Garcia in Peru. In 1985, Garcia and his APRA party took power. The 36-year-old wunderkind took presidential office with 47 percent of the vote the largest popular percentage ever recorded in Peru. A great deal of this had to do with his populist message and the failures of the previous orthodox regimes.
Garcia began implementing a wide range of liberal reforms including increased wages, slashed taxes, frozen prices and devaluation of the national currency. The result was an economic boom and presidential popularity number in the 90 percent range.
But the bottom fell out. Garcia undercut himself by reneging on foreign debt and a disastrous decision to nationalize the banking system. By the end of his term the GDP had fallen more than 30 percent and inflation had hit 7,000 percent.
Will Chavez meet such an extreme end? Probably not. Venezuela’s hole card of oil is a huge mitigating factor Chavez has been quick to capitalize on and his government has threatened a heck of a lot more than it has carried out in terms of liberalization. Perhaps the only certainty here is that the last chapter of the drama will have a lot of storylines to resolve.
This book is, by no means, the final word on this issue. But what it does provide is a dynamic and needed perspective that is often lost in the coverage of the complex relationship between the United States and Venezuela. There are serious issues at stake here for both sides and a sober look at the actual situation is possibly the most needed element to the dialouge I can think of.
This essay orginally appeared on my website kleph.com (http://www.kleph.com/blog/2005/02/currently-reading.html).
© 2004 C.J. Schexnayder
(Please note that there are no scores for this book as the book review scoring system is yet to be finalised - Ed)