kleph
22-02-2006, 07:10 AM
Larry Diamond is one of the leading experts on developing democracies and I picked up this book looking for his take on the mechanics of creating a viable representative government in post-war Iraq.
Diamond's book provides on-the-ground details for the incisive general outline James Fallows provided in Atlantic Monthly, Blind into Baghdad (http://www.epic-usa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=185).
Basically, as awe-inspiring as the Iraqi offensive was and its spectacular success in military terms it is more than offset by the colossal failure of the administration to properly prepare for the requirements of postwar Iraq. The situation has required a great deal of effort, thought and resources and, despite our progress, we have clearly fallen short in all these categories.
While I refuse to fall into either of the ridiculously polarized lines of thought about the war in Iraq I have had reservations about the effort from the very beginning for many of the reasons Diamond is outlining here after-the-fact.
Creating working democracies is a notoriously delicate business and, if experience is our guide, a notoriously unpredictable one as well. For a dramatic example you simply have to have been watching the turmoil here in South America over the past half-decade as the various countries have tried to stabalize their governments with varying degrees of success. (It is due to his work (http://www.hooverdigest.org/003/diamond.html) on this exact issue that I became aware of Diamond).
But Iraq is a completely different animal and infinitely more complex. My primary question is if it is even realistic to impose a representative democracy on this culture at all. Diamond insists the answer is yes but, given the way the U.S. led coalition has gone about it, it will now take an inordinate amount of time, money and, most likely, lives to achieve.
Diamond agrees with Fallows assessment about the two "harshest realities" we have discovered in Iraq:
That occupying the country is much more difficult than conquering it; that a breakdown in public order can jeopardize every other goal; that the ambition of patiently nurturing a new democracy is at odds with the desire to turn control over to the Iraqis quickly and get U.S. troops out; that the Sunni center of the country is the main security problem; that with each passing day Americans risk being seen less as liberators and more as occupiers, and targets.
But where Diamond moves beyond this is assessing how this process emerged from within the Green Zone and how that has hindered the efforts to establish a realistically stable democracy. Read this book and look no further than the recent headlines to see the fruit of the efforts Diamond has described, well intentioned as they may be.
This is not the ultimate book on the effort to establish an independent democratic government in Iraq. It is most certainly not the ultimate book on the mishandling of the whole business by the Bush administration and the post-conflict occupational government. But it is a disturbing signpost on a path that almost certainly we will find ourselves following for many years to come.
This essay originally appeared on my webpage kleph.com (http://www.kleph.com/blog/2005/08/department-of-running-items_28.html).
© 2005 C.J. Schexnayder
(Please note that there are no scores for this book as the book review scoring system is yet to be finalised - Ed)
Diamond's book provides on-the-ground details for the incisive general outline James Fallows provided in Atlantic Monthly, Blind into Baghdad (http://www.epic-usa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=185).
Basically, as awe-inspiring as the Iraqi offensive was and its spectacular success in military terms it is more than offset by the colossal failure of the administration to properly prepare for the requirements of postwar Iraq. The situation has required a great deal of effort, thought and resources and, despite our progress, we have clearly fallen short in all these categories.
While I refuse to fall into either of the ridiculously polarized lines of thought about the war in Iraq I have had reservations about the effort from the very beginning for many of the reasons Diamond is outlining here after-the-fact.
Creating working democracies is a notoriously delicate business and, if experience is our guide, a notoriously unpredictable one as well. For a dramatic example you simply have to have been watching the turmoil here in South America over the past half-decade as the various countries have tried to stabalize their governments with varying degrees of success. (It is due to his work (http://www.hooverdigest.org/003/diamond.html) on this exact issue that I became aware of Diamond).
But Iraq is a completely different animal and infinitely more complex. My primary question is if it is even realistic to impose a representative democracy on this culture at all. Diamond insists the answer is yes but, given the way the U.S. led coalition has gone about it, it will now take an inordinate amount of time, money and, most likely, lives to achieve.
Diamond agrees with Fallows assessment about the two "harshest realities" we have discovered in Iraq:
That occupying the country is much more difficult than conquering it; that a breakdown in public order can jeopardize every other goal; that the ambition of patiently nurturing a new democracy is at odds with the desire to turn control over to the Iraqis quickly and get U.S. troops out; that the Sunni center of the country is the main security problem; that with each passing day Americans risk being seen less as liberators and more as occupiers, and targets.
But where Diamond moves beyond this is assessing how this process emerged from within the Green Zone and how that has hindered the efforts to establish a realistically stable democracy. Read this book and look no further than the recent headlines to see the fruit of the efforts Diamond has described, well intentioned as they may be.
This is not the ultimate book on the effort to establish an independent democratic government in Iraq. It is most certainly not the ultimate book on the mishandling of the whole business by the Bush administration and the post-conflict occupational government. But it is a disturbing signpost on a path that almost certainly we will find ourselves following for many years to come.
This essay originally appeared on my webpage kleph.com (http://www.kleph.com/blog/2005/08/department-of-running-items_28.html).
© 2005 C.J. Schexnayder
(Please note that there are no scores for this book as the book review scoring system is yet to be finalised - Ed)